Quick takes on Thursday, Oct. 7, Illinois Supreme Court opinions

CIVIL

Vancura v. Katris

By Jean M. Prendergast, Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C Today, in Vancura v. Katris, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously reversed a trial court’s ruling that Kinko’s, Inc. (“Kinko’s”) bore liability for an employee’s decision to notarize plaintiff’s signature, which caused the loss of plaintiff’s interest in a mortgage note. It was undisputed that plaintiff never signed the document at issue. Plaintiff posited three theories: (1) violation of Section 7-102 of the Illinois Notary Public Act (“Act”) (5 ILCS 312/7-102 (West 1996)); (2) negligent training; and (3) negligent supervision. Interestingly, the Court disagreed with the appellate court’s determination that Kinko’s forfeited review of the common law claims by failing to provide adequate legal support. Instead, while the Court found certain of Kinko’s cited cases unpersuasive, it nevertheless found the citations and argument sufficient to satisfy Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7). In contrast, the Court ruled that plaintiff violated Rule 341(h)(7), and thus, forfeited his right to review of the appellate court’s judgment against him on his claim for violation of the Act. The Court next examined the common law claims and held that Section 7-102 of the Act was intended to modify the common law. Thus, the common law duty of employers of notaries extends only as far as the Act; the employer has a duty not to consent to the official misconduct of its employees. Plaintiff never argued that Kinko’s had any knowledge of its employee’s misconduct. Thus, the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment imposing liability against Kinko’s for negligent supervision. Finally, the Court expressed no opinion on whether an employer of a notary has a general duty to train because the plaintiff never raised the issue. Rather, the Court defined the scope of an employer’s duty once training has been provided. The Court held that where an employer provides training to notary public employees, it must ensure that the training conforms to the Act. The Court then reversed the judgment in favor of plaintiff, and found that the evidence at trial supported Kinko’s claim that it fulfilled its duty to ensure compliance with the Act during training. Opinion 108652 Case summary

CRIMINAL

People v. Sanders

By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender In general terms, a claim that was raised – or could have been raised – on direct appeal is barred by the principle of res judicata from being raised again in collateral proceedings. In People v. Sanders, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging that the trial court erred by failing to voir dire potential jurors on the subject of gang bias; defendant had raised this issue on direct appeal in 1994, but claimed that he could raise it again in collateral proceedings as he was relying upon the decision in People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467 (2000), in which the Supreme Court imposed upon the trial court the duty to ask potential jurors about gang bias whenever gang evidence is integral to the defendant’s trial, a case that obviously had not been available to defendant during his direct appeal. However, a case determined after a defendant’s conviction may be applied retroactively to collateral proceedings only where it does not announce a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court in Sanders first examined whether Strain announced a new rule, and determined that it did, noting in part Justice Heiple’s description of Strain as “revolutionary” in his dissent in Strain. The Court noted that the scope of voir dire was generally committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that Strain represented a break from precedent by removing the trial court’s discretion where gang evidence will be integral to a defendant’s trial. The Court rejected defendant’s argument that there is a difference between a new rule and a change in the law. Therefore, Strain was found to announce a new rule that could not be applied retroactively to collateral proceedings, thus rendering defendant’s petition barred by res judicata. Opinion 109014 Case summary

People v. Ramsey

By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender In People v. Ramsey, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s death sentence for the murders of two victims, the attempted murders of three others, aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion.  One question that might normally be of interest beyond the realm of capital cases is one of retroactivity of Supreme Court Rules, in that there was a question as to whether Supreme Court Rule 701, which requires counsel in all capital cases to be members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar, applied before its effective date. The Supreme Court held that, because defendant’s case was ongoing before the effective date of Rule 701 (b), it was outside the scope of the amendments to Rule 701.  Given that the trial attorneys in all other ongoing capital cases were members of the CLTB, this issue is of little impact beyond the instant case. Conversely, the Court applied authorities from the appellate court in noncapital cases to determine, for the first time, whether a sanction imposed upon a capital defendant for a discovery violation was excessive. In a determination limited to the specific facts of this case, the Court found the sanction – the exclusion of one question and answer from an expert witness testifying for the defendant – was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, particularly since it was one question from 11 days of hearings involving 51 witnesses, and given the trial court’s knowledge that the expert’s testimony contained information from which defense counsel could argue, and the jury could find, the existence of the mitigation factor. Opinion 105942 Case summary