Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, December 16, 2021
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys reviews the eight Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, December 16.
Armstead v. National Freight, Inc., 2021 IL 126730
By Amelia Buragas, J.D.
In Armstead v. National Freight, Inc., 2021 IL 126730, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that appellate court jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) is limited and pertains solely to orders dismissing claims. Rule 304(a) does not give the court jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders that merely limit the issues that can be pursued within a claim, even if the circuit court enters a rule 304(a) finding.
Plaintiff Clifton Armstead was injured on March 6, 2015, when he was struck by a vehicle at the entrance of a truck terminal in Minooka, Illinois. Armstead filed a workers’ compensation claim against his employer and ultimately entered into a settlement agreement. The signed agreement stated Armstead suffered a right knee strain and that he did not sustain any other injury or medical condition because of the collision. Armstead also filed a personal injury complaint against the driver of the vehicle that struck him as well as the driver’s employer. In the personal injury lawsuit, Armstead alleged that he suffered injuries to his knee, lower back, and shoulder. After the settlement of Armstead’s workers’ compensation claim, the defendants in the negligence action filed a motion for partial summary judgment or summary determination of a major issue arguing that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries and that those injuries were limited to a right knee strain.
The circuit court granted defendants’ motion, finding that plaintiff’s statement regarding his right knee strain constituted a judicial admission and that plaintiff was prohibited from claiming additional injuries. The circuit court further found there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). While the appeal was pending, Plaintiff filed a motion in the trial court to voluntarily dismiss his remaining cause of action. The trial court granted the dismissal as to “any potential claims for injuries aside from [a] ‘right knee strain.’” The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment by finding that plaintiff’s contentions of additional injury were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed plaintiff’s leave to appeal.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Overstreet and joined by Justices Garman, Theis, and Michael J. Burke, held that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court noted that Supreme Court Rule 304(a) allows parties to take an appeal only from final judgments that affect “one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims,” and that the circuit court’s order was not a final order. Rather, it was an order that “resolved an issue, not a claim.” The court explained that the circuit court’s order did not dispose of the entirety of plaintiff’s negligence claim, which remained pending in the circuit court. Thus, because the circuit court’s order merely disposed of an issue, i.e., whether plaintiff’s allegations were limited by a previous judicial admission, the circuit court’s ruling was not subject to review under Rule 304(a). Because the plaintiff subsequently voluntarily dismissed his cause of action and did not refile within the one-year limitation in section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court further found plaintiff’s action “remains dismissed.” Therefore, the Supreme Court ordered that the appellate court’s decision be vacated due to lack of jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the circuit court for dismissal.
Justice Burke, concurring in part and dissenting in part and joined by Justice Neville, agreed with the majority that the plaintiff’s appeal was improper under Rule 304(a). The dissent disagreed, however, with the majority’s decision to remand the cause to the circuit court for dismissal. The dissent noted that in the trial court the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss his “claim” for a right knee strain and reasoned that “just as plaintiff’s appeal was improper,” so too was the motion to voluntarily dismiss because it “asked for something that did not exist.” As a result, the dissent argued that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a legal nullity that should not be given any effect. The dissent explained that both the parties and the circuit court were operating under a “false assumption” that there were separate claims for different bodily injuries and that “[t]his error infected the entire proceedings.” The dissent asserted that the appropriate remedy would be to vacate the circuit court’s voluntary dismissal order and to “put the parties back to square one” by remanding the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Justice Carter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Thomas v. Khoury, 2021 IL 126074
By Joanne R. Driscoll, Forde & O’Meara LLP
In this case, the Court answered the following certified question: “Whether section 2.2 of the Wrongful Death Act (the Act), 740 ILCS 180/2.2, bars a cause of action against a defendant for fetal death if the defendant knew or had a medical reason to know of the pregnancy and the alleged malpractice resulted in a non-viable fetus that died as a result of a lawful abortion with requisite consent.”
The majority, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Anne Burke, answered the question in the negative, agreeing with the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, and overruling a conflicting decision from the Third District in Light v. Proctor Community Hospital, 182 Ill. App. 3d 563 (1989). Noteworthy is the strongly-worded dissent authored by Justice Garman and joined by Justice Michael Burke.
In this case, a wrongful death action was brought against two physicians alleged to have negligently failed to recognize that the plaintiff was pregnant before performing elective surgery on her and administering anesthesia, pain medication, and antibiotics. Plaintiff was informed by another physician that the fetus would not survive to term and the pregnancy should be terminated. She elected to have a lawful, consensual abortion and then sued the first two physicians for allegedly causing the death of the fetus.
The defendants moved to dismiss arguing that the “immediate cause of the fetus’s death” was the abortion, not their negligent conduct and that section 2.2 of the Act made a lawful, consensual abortion a superseding cause, at least where the defendant is a physician or medical institution.
After explaining the concept of superseding cause, the majority opinion applied rules of statutory construction, noting that section 2.2 was in derogation of the common law and had to be strictly construed. Reading section 2.2’s plain language, the majority noted that section 2.2 said nothing about abortions being a superseding cause or barring a wrongful death action against another physician who injures a fetus during a procedure that is entirely separate from an abortion. The majority also cited legislative history to support its holding that section 2.2 did not protect the defendant physicians as a matter of law. The majority noted, however, that the defendants were free to argue common law principles of proximate cause and superseding cause on remand.
In her lengthy dissent, highly critical of the majority’s decision, Justice Garman opined that section 2.2 sets forth a categorical ban on wrongful death actions against physicians when a plaintiff chooses to undergo a lawful and consensual abortion. It is not limited to the physician performing the abortion and instead prohibits an action against any physician for wrongful death of a fetus caused by an abortion.
Characterizing the majority’s discussion of Light as a “gross misinterpretation,” Justice Garman opined that Light was correct. Here, as in Light, the plain language of section 2.2 requires the death of the fetus to be the result of a wrongful act, not the lawful and consensual abortion.
Criticizing the majority for “cherry pick[ing]” statements from legislative history and ignoring the historical context of the Act, the dissent opined that it was clear that section 2.2 assures that a wrongful death action cannot be brought on behalf of an aborted fetus when the abortion was lawful and when it was lawfully performed by a doctor. Also relying on logic, the dissent reasoned that a “lawful abortion with requisite consent cannot be a wrongful death because the act of obtaining a lawful and consensual abortion is not a wrongful act; it is a lawful act effectuating the lawful death of a fetus.” This is in line with the primary purpose of the statute, which was to ensure physicians, regardless of whether they were the ones performing the abortion, would not be held liable or be deterred in any way from performing abortions, recommending abortions, or participating in abortions out of fear of liability.
Mancini Law Group, P.C. v. Schaumburg Police Department , 2021 IL 126675
By Joanne R. Driscoll, Forde & O’Meara LLP
In this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016)) case, the Court answered the question of whether a public agency lost any right to withhold unredacted records (here, traffic accident reports) after providing those same unredacted records to a third-party vendor (LexisNexis), without restriction and pursuant to mandated reporting under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-408 (West 2016)), particularly when that vendor was allowed to sell the unredacted accident reports to the public, without restrictions or privacy protections of the individuals involved. The circuit court upheld the withholding, and that decision was affirmed on appeal, with a dissent.
In a decision authored by Justice Garman, with a special concurrence by Justice Carter, the Court affirmed the lower courts, holding that an Illinois public body does not have the ability to waive an individual’s interest in his or her personal or private information in public records that are subject to a FOIA request.
The Court began its analysis by discussing its holding in Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 413 (1997), cited by the plaintiff in support of its waiver argument. The Court distinguished Lieber on its facts and then rejected the defendant’s argument that 2010 amendments to the FOIA overturned Lieber’s waiver rule.
For its decision, the Court found persuasive federal law interpreting the federal Freedom of Information Act, particularly Sherman v. United States Department of the Army, 244 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2001), cited by neither party. The court in that case acknowledged concern over selective disclosure by government agencies of exempted information but held that only the individual whose informational privacy interests are protected by an exemption can effect a waiver of those privacy interests when they are threatened by a FOIA request. Id. at 363-64. Having found no waiver, the Sherman court then balanced the public interest in disclosure of the information sought against the privacy interests of the individuals and concluded that the invasion of the informational privacy interests of individuals would clearly be unwarranted. Id. at 366-67.
Adopting the reasoning of Sherman, the Court held that the redacted information at issue in this case is attributable to private individuals, is protected by sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and cannot be waived by the defendant’s handling or mishandling thereof. The Court did not engage in any balancing of interests, like the Sherman court, because it found that the circuit court had conducted that inquiry in favor of nondisclosure and the defendant did not take issue with that determination.
Addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the vendor was allowed to sell the unredacted accident reports to the public, without restrictions or privacy protections of the individuals involved, the Court concluded, as did the Sherman court, that it was not material to waiver and refused to “entertain this rigid argument to the detriment of private individuals.”
Justice Carter, in his special concurrence agreed with the judgment but wrote separately for two reasons. First, he disagreed with the Court’s failure to find that the 2010 amendments to section 7 were relevant and that their plain language gave government agency’s discretion to redact when disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Second, Justice Carter did not join in the portion of the opinion that relied on Sherman because that case was not cited by either party. While he did not disagree with the Court’s analysis of Sherman, he opined that the instant case should have been decided on the statutory construction arguments made by the parties.
In re Julie M., 2021 IL 125768
By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan
Julie M., the respondent to petition by Carle Foundation Hospital for emergency admission by certification under the Medical Health Code, arrived at Carle via EMS after swallowing batteries in an apparent suicide attempt. Members of the Carle staff were familiar with her because she had been treated at Carle weeks before, also for swallowing batteries. She had done the same thing yet once more earlier in this same year, and had been diagnosed with multiple medical illnesses. Carle does not have a psychiatric ward, but rather a psychiatric team that provides for those needs of patients throughout the hospital.
Respondent’s medical needs were treated by Carle, which included open abdominal surgery to remove the last battery which was impossible to retrieve by less invasive measures. During that course of medical treatment, respondent expressed suicidal ideations and attempted to hurt herself on several occasions. As a result, she required sitters at all times.
The legal setting of this case began to come into sharper relief when the respondent’s surgical issues were resolving but with her wound staples still in place. Her internist found that she was medically stable for discharge, but recognized that actual discharge would not occur until all of the care teams agreed. The psychiatry team felt that she was not ready for discharge while she still had the staples in place in light of the history of swallowing foreign objects. Further, respondent had nowhere else to go and the respondent’s mother and were considering a homeless shelter.
After the surgical staples were removed, a petition for the emergency admission under the Mental Health Code was executed by a hospital social worker, which was the first of the steps leading to a court commitment hearing.
Respondent argued, in extremely broad summary, that the initiation of the proceedings for commitment came too late under Sections 3-604 and 3-610 of the Mental Health Code. The circuit court disagreed and ultimately ordered her hospitalized for no more than ninety days. Respondent appealed. The appellate court found that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness applied and affirmed the circuit court. Here, the supreme court affirmed the appellate court’s disposition, although the court expressly noted that it was not bound by the appellate court’s reasoning and may affirm on any basis presented in the record. Chief Justice Anne M. Burke dissented, with an opinion joined by Justice Neville.
It would do a disservice to the court, the parties, and the intricacies of the Mental Health Code to undertake in this summary format to narrate the precise holdings in this case and the equally important manner in which the court wended its way through several of its earlier opinions. Generally stated, the court took up the “start/stop triggers” under Section 3-610 of the Code. The Code requires that not later than twenty-four hours after admission of a respondent pursuant to Article VI, the respondent shall be examined by a psychiatrist. A “central dispute” in this case was when was respondent admitted. On appeal, she argued that she was admitted on the day that she presented at the hospital as a result of her attempted suicide, stating that she was always a mental health case, with an alternative argument that the period began when she was first afforded psychiatric treatment. The court rejected those arguments, stating instead that the analysis is when the respondent’s status change from “not admitted under the Mental Health Code” to “admitted under the Mental Health Code.” The court concluded that until the required petition and certificate are properly executed, no legal admission under Article VI of the Code has occurred.
The court undertook an extensive analysis of Linda B., 2017 IL 119392. Distilling the application of that case to this case, the court stated that the primary impact was that Carle qualifies as a “mental health facility” under these facts. Addressing a controversy concerning burdens of proof in Linda B., the court states here that the case is best understood as relying upon the general principle of appellate law that any doubt in the record concerning facts will be held against the appellant.
The court held that Section 3-604 does not apply to this case because Carle never purported to detain respondent on the basis of a petition alone.
People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432
By Jay Wiegman, Assistant Appellate Defender
In People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a juvenile defendant, charged with two counts of first degree murder, who avoided a mandatory life sentence by entering a fully negotiated guilty plea in exchange for a fifty-year sentence (that is now considered a de facto life sentence) was precluded from raising a claim that his plea was void because it was premised on a now-unconstitutional mandatory life sentence. In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the additional protections for juvenile offenders established by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) apply only when a trial court lacks, or refuses to use, discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to a life, or de facto life, sentence.
Robert Christopher Jones was 16 years old when he was charged with the first degree murders of an elderly couple. In 2000, he entered into a fully negotiated guilty plea to one count of first degree murder and some lesser charges and was sentenced to 50 years for the murder, to be served concurrently with the other convictions. Ultimately, relying on Miller and its progeny, the defendant filed a successive post-conviction petition, in which he argued that his 50-year sentence was unconstitutional. His petition for leave to file a successive petition was denied, and the Appellate Court, Third District, upheld the dismissal, and the defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal. While that pended, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, which held that a sentence of more than 40 years constitutes a de facto life sentence for a juvenile offender, and remanded the matter back to the Appellate Court to reconsider the defendant’s petition in light of Buffer. The Appellate Court again affirmed the circuit court’s decision, reasoning that the defendant waived any Eighth Amendment sentencing challenges that were based on Miller. Additionally, the Appellate Court held that Jones could not establish prejudice because his negotiated guilty plea meant that the sentencing scheme did not apply to him.
In a 5-2 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the trial court’s denial of Jones’ motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. Writing for the majority, Justice Carter stated that had the statutory scheme that mandated a natural life sentence actually been applied in this case, then Jones’ argument would have presented a claim that the Court could have reviewed on its legal merits, but because his plea avoided the application of the mandatory scheme, Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders did not apply to Jones.
The majority reasoned that a defendant forecloses any claim of error by entering a negotiated plea agreement, partly because of contract principles. The majority relied upon Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in which the defendant pled guilty to avoid the death penalty, for the proposition that a “voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” The majority also cited Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F. 3d 171 (4th Cir. 2016), which relied upon Brady to support its decision that a juvenile could not withdraw his fully negotiated guilty plea that was motivated by his desire to avoid the death penalty.
The majority also noted that, because of the plea, there was little on the record to suggest that the defendant possessed any possible defenses. Further, Jones could not establish that the circuit court did not exercise its discretion in imposing a discretionary life sentence. Therefore, the denial of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition was proper, as defendant’s claims were not cognizable under Miller.
Justice Neville dissented, and was joined by Chief Justice Burke. Justice Neville would hold that Miller protections must be guaranteed to juvenile offenders who plead guilty as well as to those who take their cases to trial. Beginning in 2005, five years after Jones entered his plea, Justice Neville traced the evolution of cases in which the United States Supreme Court recognized that juvenile offenders are constitutionally different from adult defendants with regard to sentencing, and observed that the Illinois Supreme Court has embraced all of those holdings, as has the Illinois Legislature, which has codified the rule articulated in Miller. The dissent stated that the instant decision ignores United States and Illinois juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.
The dissent distinguished Brady, noting that Brady was an adult, and that he only faced the possibility of a death sentence, whereas Jones faced a mandatory life sentence if convicted of both murder charges.
The dissent rejected the majority’s claim that the circuit court could have rejected the plea proposal, in part because it was unlikely that the court would reject it, and because there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that the court consider any mitigating factors related to the defendant’s youth. The dissent also considered contract analysis to be inappropriate because constitutional rights are not subject to the same waiver principles that contracts, such as plea agreements, are. Further, the dissent observed that, in any other context, a juvenile such as Jones would not be bound by a contractual obligation.
People v. Fane, 2021 IL 126715
By Amelia Buragas, J.D.
In a 4-3 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Fane, 2012 IL 126715, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it tendered a modified version of the accomplice witness instruction. However, this finding was not the main point of contention between the majority and dissent. Rather, the core of the dispute between the majority and the dissent revolved around whether it is proper to tender the accomplice witness instruction when the witness’ testimony is offered by the defendant. The majority answered that question in the affirmative, finding that IPI Criminal 3.17 may be given regardless of whether the testimony implicates or exonerates the defendant.
In December 2016, defendant Twiqwon R. Fane and a second man, Drean McGee, were apprehended by police near the site of a residential break-in. Defendant was charged with, among other crimes, residential burglary, aggravated battery of a victim over 60, home invasion, and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. At trial, McGee testified on defendant’s behalf, telling the jury that while he and defendant had been at a tavern earlier in the evening of the break-in they parted ways prior to the burglary. McGee told that jury that he had pled guilty to the residential burglary and testified that his sole accomplice was a man named James Beal. McGee also testified that he and the defendant had been friends for more than 15 years.
During the jury instruction conference, the State tendered and defendant objected to IPI Criminal No. 3.17, which states as follows: “When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.” The State argued that while it was inappropriate to give IPI Criminal No. 3.17 when the accomplice’s testimony completely exonerated the defendant, McGee’s testimony did not exonerate defendant with respect to the charge of resisting arrest. The trial court agreed, and the instruction was given over defendant’s objection. The trial court also modified the instruction to read, “if the . . . witness testified that he participated in the crime with which the defendant is charged.” The jury found the defendant guilty, and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding that while IPI Criminal No. 3.17 may be given where the accomplice implicates a defendant in a crime, it is not proper where the testimony of the accomplice witness exculpates a defendant.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal and rejected defendant’s argument that tendering IPI Criminal 3.17 is appropriate only when the accomplice implicates defendant in a crime. The court noted that it “has long deemed it appropriate to advise juries that an alleged accomplice’s testimony may be viewed with suspicion.” While the court acknowledged that the term “accomplice” is generally applied to those testifying against their fellow defendants, the definition of the term is more expansive, leading the court to previously conclude that there is no reason “why one who is in fact an accomplice should not have his testimony scrutinized carefully before it is relied on, no matter on which side of the case he testified.” Thus, the majority held that “a trial court need not find ‘implication’ before giving the accomplice witness instruction.”
The court further found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave a modified version of IPI Criminal 3.17 because giving the instruction in its unmodified form could have confused the jury: “IPI Criminal 3.17 applies ‘[w]hen a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant.’ MgGee testified, however, that he and another man committed the crime and that defendant did not participate.” The Supreme Court noted that the trial court has the discretion to give a non-IPI instruction so long as it is an “accurate, impartial, and nonargumentative summation of the law.” The court found that the modified instruction met this standard and that the trial court appropriately adjusted the wording of the instruction to be consistent with McGee’s testimony.
Justice Michael J. Burke wrote a dissent joined by Justices Anne M. Burke and Neville. The dissent argued that the accomplice witness instruction “is designed to alert the jury to a witness’ motivation to testify falsely for the State in exchange for leniency” and should only be given at the request of the defendant. Thus, the dissent reasoned that the trial court abused its discretion when it gave IPI Criminal 3.17 because “[t]he errant instruction unduly prejudiced defendant’s ability to use favorable testimony from McGee.” The dissent argued that this error was avoidable because the jury was already properly instructed as to McGee’s credibility by IPI Criminal 1.02 and that when a witness admits his own involvement in the charged offense, but denies that the defendant participated, IPI Criminal No. 1.02 “can be used to instruct the jury to consider the witness’ biases and prejudices that potentially affect his testimony.”
People v. Carter, 2021 IL 125954
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
In March 2016, two Chicago police officers received information from dispatch that an anonymous caller had reported that a male, who was wearing a black jacket and hoodie and in possession of a gun, was walking with two females and “swinging at” them, in the area of 33rd and Wallace. Officer Robert Luzadder and his partner responded but did not see anybody matching the description. A few minutes later, dispatch relayed that the tipster called back and said that the people were now at a location approximately two blocks away. David Carter was found at that second location, wearing clothing matching that described by the caller and holding the right side of his waistband. The officers did not see two women in the area, and they did not observe Carter violate any laws. Luzadder testified that his experience led him to believe that Carter was attempting to conceal a firearm under his clothing.
Luzadder exited his squad car and ordered Carter to stop and to place his hands on the car. Luzadder testified that Carter was patted down for safety purposes because the caller had reported a firearm and the officers observed Carter holding his waistband. Luzadder recovered a revolver from Carter as a result of the pat down. On this evidence the circuit court denied a motion to suppress, and Carter was convicted of armed habitual criminal. The appellate court affirmed.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the stop-and-frisk of defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion and thus did not violate the fourth amendment. Carter argued that the anonymous tip was inadequate to support the Terry stop because the caller did not explain the basis of his knowledge or predict any future behavior; the tip was not corroborated where the caller reported a man assaulting two women, but no women were with Carter when he was arrested; and Carter’s act of holding his waistband was insufficient corroboration.
While an anonymous tip is generally considered less reliable, the totality of the circumstances here rendered the tip sufficiently reliable to form the basis for a Terry stop. The call came in through the 911 system, which supports a finding of veracity because such calls can be traced and recorded. The tipster provided real-time information, suggesting he was observing possible criminal activity firsthand, where he called a second time with updated information about the offender’s location. Luzadder observed Carter wearing clothing matching the tipster’s description, and Carter appeared to be concealing a firearm, consistent with the tipster’s statement that the suspect was armed. While Carter argued that people also secure innocent items in their waistbands, the officer’s conclusion that Carter appeared to be concealing a firearm was reasonable given that he was responding to a tip of an individual matching Carter’s description carrying a firearm. Thus, suppression of the firearm was not warranted.
The Supreme Court went on to reverse Carter’s conviction of armed habitual criminal, however, where the State conceded that it had not proved that Carter had the proper qualifying predicate convictions. Because the trial court had merged convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon into the AHC conviction, the Supreme Court remanded for resentencing on those lesser convictions.
Justice Neville dissented on the fourth amendment issue, concluding that if Carter’s actions here “were sufficient to warrant a Terry stop, then anyone walking with a hand on his or her waist may be stopped.” Justice Neville agreed with Carter’s arguments that the anonymous tip in this case was more similar to that in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). In J.L., an anonymous caller stated that a person matching a certain description would be found at a specific location in possession of a gun. Officers went to that location and found an individual matching the description. Based solely on the tip, they frisked the man and found a gun. Ultimately, the gun was suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search. An accurate description of an individual’s location and appearance, alone, does not show that a tipster has knowledge of criminal activity. Justice Neville noted that here, while the caller also reported criminal activity – an individual assaulting two women at a specific location – the officers did not observe the reported assault or any other criminal activity when they encountered Carter. Accordingly, Justice Neville would have found the tip here to be one of general criminality, much like the one in J.L., and therefore insufficient to support a Terry stop.
People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Hayze Schoonover was charged with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child against his niece, M.L., and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. M.L. was the first witness to testify at trial, and the court stated it wanted the courtroom cleared during her testimony “except for family members.” Schoonover’s counsel noted that his family members were present and asked, “are you barring them?” to which the court responded, “Out.” The court subsequently cited 725 ILCS 5/115-11 in support of its decision to clear the courtroom, “with the exception of the media” and also specifically allowed a request for M.L.’s grandmother to stay. The court allowed M.L.’s father and stepfather to be present during her testimony, as well, and the courtroom was reopened to any and all spectators after M.L.’s testimony. At the conclusion of trial, Schoonover was convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced to a total of 85 years of imprisonment.
In the appellate court, Schoonover argued that the partial closure of the courtroom violated Section 115-11 as well as his constitutional right to a public trial under the sixth amendment. The State argued that Schoonover’s claims were forfeited because counsel had not objected to closure of the courtroom, and the record did not show that Schoonover’s family members or anyone else with a direct interest in the case had been excluded. Schoonover also did not raise the issue in his post-trial motion. The appellate court majority agreed the claims had been forfeited but went on to review the matter for plain error. The appellate court majority found second-prong plain error, reversed Schoonover’s convictions, and remanded for a new trial. The dissenting justice agreed that the trial court should have conducted a more extensive inquiry into who wished to be present and their relationships to the parties, but ultimately concluded that Schoonover failed to clearly object to the procedure and to meet his burden of showing a violation of his public trial right.
The Supreme Court reversed. Agreeing that the issue had been forfeited, the Court began its analysis by looking at the specific language of Section 115-11 to determine whether there had been a clear and obvious error. The statue provides that in a prosecution for certain sex offenses, where the alleged victim is under 18 years old, “the court may exclude from the proceedings while the victim is testifying, all persons, who, in the opinion of the court, do not have a direct interest in the case, except the media.” The Court also looked to its decision in People v. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d 220 (1996), in which it found no error under similar facts where the court did not “close” the courtroom but only excluded some spectators during the minor victim’s testimony, the people excluded from the courtroom during that testimony were not immediate family members of the parties and thus had no direct interest in the outcome, and the court did not exclude the media.
As in Falaster, the court here did not close the courtroom but only ordered temporary removal of spectators. The record was clear that the media was not excluded. And, the court allowed specific requests from the prosecutor for certain of the victim’s family members to remain.
Schoonover argued that the record showed that his family members had been excluded where defense counsel noted their presence and asked if the court was barring them, to which the court responded, “out.” The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the record showed that the court was amenable to allowing requests for family members to remain but Schoonover had not made a specific request, and the record failed to show that any individuals who were excluded were members of Schoonover’s immediate family.
Likewise, the court’s failure to make specific findings did not render the exclusion of spectators improper. The plain language of the statute does not require express findings, but rather the judge “need only formulate an opinion as to whether the spectators being excluded have a direct interest in the case,” which is a matter left to the court’s discretion. Thus, the statute was not violated.
Similarly, the court rejected Schoonover’s constitutional challenge. Not every courtroom closure violates the sixth amendment, and the partial, temporary exclusion of spectators here was not improper. The media was allowed to remain, and it is well settled that the presence of the medial preserves the public trial right and the fundamental protections afforded by that right. Thus, Schoonover did not suffer a violation of his right to a public trial.
Justice Neville dissented, concluding that the trial judge erred by excluding spectators without inquiring as to their interest in the case. Without such inquiry, the judge heard no evidence upon which to form an opinion as to whether they had a right to remain under the terms of section 115-11. Accordingly, he would have found an abuse of discretion. And, he would have found that the court’s failure amounted to structural error requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.