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ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

FAMILY LAW

The newsletter of the Illinois State Bar Association's Section on Family Law

Chair's column

By Kimberly J. Anderson

I recently attended the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' annual Columbus Day MCLE Program. It was a great program, and one you should put on your calendar for next year. It was well worth the money.

One speaker, Dr. Sol Rappaport, stood out. His topic addressed the impact of divorce on children. His topic, "What We Think We Know, What We Know, and What We Need to Do," was interesting, particularly his comments on parenting plans. First he addressed the three main concerns for children of divorce, parental conflict, a destabilized parent-child relationship, and lastly, the father's involvement. Dr. Rappaport stated that if those three areas were dealt with appropriately, children of divorce are not as impacted by the divorce as we think.

Dr. Rappaport's comments are parenting plans and the lack of research supporting the "experts" opinions about them was very thought provoking. We use custody evaluators to help guide us when determining what the best parenting plans are, but when a custody evaluator offers his/her opinion, according to Dr. Rappaport, it is based solely on theory and experience, because there is a lack of research on parenting plans. No one has researched families who are getting divorced, put them in different parenting schedules, controlled issues such as conflict and finances, and then seen how children adjust. Dr. Rappaport said that although there are studies that address parental involvement, there are no studies that take families, put them in different parenting schedules, and assess the outcomes.

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College expense contributions by divorced parents: Reservations about reservation provisions

By Cecilia Hynes Griffin and Scott P. Kramer

When two individuals obtain a divorce, all of their financial issues are not necessarily fully and finally resolved upon entry of the divorce decree. For individuals with children, they may enter their divorced lives with a particularly crucial financial question unresolved—who will pay for college? Courts do not always require divorcing parties to expressly allocate the cost of their children's college expenses between themselves upon termination of their marriage. Rather, the issue of each party's respective obligation to contribute to their children's college expenses is instead often "reserved" for future determination pursuant to Section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act ("IMDMA"). In other words, a party can petition the court to allocate college expenses at a later date (usually when their children are closer to college age). Given the popularity of these reservation provisions in divorce decrees, family law practitioners must understand the ramifications of these provisions, and how to best convert the "reservation" into actual college expense contributions.

Most recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois recognized that reservation provisions are not

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Chair's column

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Since there is no actual research pointing us to the right direction, the drafters or mediators of the parenting plans, and ultimately the judges, need to think outside of the box. Every case should not consist of a schedule of every other weekend and one night during the week for dinner. While that might work for some families, this cookie cutter model we have been using is not always the best plan.

Dr. Rappaport discussed one study that was taken of children of divorce when the children had reached college age. In that study, the "children" were asked if they had enough parenting time with their non-custodial parent. Over 70% of the surveyed children said that they wanted more time with the non-custodial parent and would have liked to spend one-half of the time with them. Another study showed that college students who lived in a shared physical arrangement between their parents had fewer feelings of loss, unlike the college students who did not live in a shared parenting arrangement.

I wholeheartedly agree with Dr. Rappaport and have attempted many times to get a parenting schedule entered which involves a baby having weekends with the non-custodial parent, or overnight visitation during the week with an older child. These suggestions are often met with resistance by my opposing counsel or the judge. They cite many reasons why the time should be limited..... too confusing, too much turmoil, too much back and forth, etc. The people resisting more parenting time for the non-custodial parent, I call them the "resisters," will point to the child's lack of progress in school and behavioral problems the child is having. If a child is acting out, the resisters often suggest limiting time with the non-custodial parent. School grades coming down? Take time away from the non-custodial parent after school. That parent is probably not helping with homework, or because the child is spending time with the other parent, then there is no time for school work. But what if the child is really having problems adjusting to only seeing their other parent overnight only four nights in a month, instead of the time that they used to spend? Maybe this is the reason for the acting out or the bad grades.

I would like to see the people involved with the developing of the parenting plans consider the research cited by Dr. Rappaport. Allow infants to have overnights with a parent. According to him, there is no research that shows the impact of when overnights should begin with the infant. There is research that indicates that in separated and divorced families, (where there is no domestic violence) children ages 4-6 showed better adjustment if they had one or more overnights. Yet you hear lawyers and judges resist having infants spend the night with the non-custodial parent, often stating that it is not good for the infant. According to Dr. Rappaport, these opinions are based on theory, and theories can be wrong, and are often used to support one's own agenda. People will pick theories that agree with their views, and then use the theory as support for their view.

He discussed the different theories over the years that have been proven wrong. "The earth is flat." The theory about Autism. At one time, it was thought that the cause of Autism was a cold mother, known as a "refrigerator mother." He discussed Attachment Theory, wherein it was believed that an infant could only form one main attachment.

Look at the research available before deciding that the non-custodial parent should only have every other weekend and one night during the week. While every family needs to have its individual considerations and needs addressed, consider that one-half of the children in divorced families wanted more contact with their father. Research states that closeness to a father increased when there was increased time with their father. Children with a better father-child relationship do better in many aspects of their lives, emotionally and physically. Children who are involved with their father have better grades and can adjust to the divorce better.

Our work does impact people's lives, and we should strive to make sure that the children are not caught up in their parent's battles. We should be pushing our clients, the opposing party and the courts to come up with more realistic schedules for the non-custodial parent. It impacts the children, the research says so. ■

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College expense contributions by divorced parents: Reservations about reservation provisions

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the equivalent of a blank check to be cashed at any time. To the contrary, *In re the Marriage of Petersen*, No. 1108984, 2011 WL 4391130 (Ill. Sep. 22, 2011), holds that a divorced party, whose divorce decree reserves the issue of college expenses and who wishes to later petition a court to force their ex-spouse to contribute to said expenses, cannot obtain contributions for expenses that predate the petition.

The implications of such a rule are evident upon review of the facts in *Petersen*. In *Petersen,* the trial court entered the parties' divorce decree on August 27, 1999. Upon entry of the divorce decree, the wife received sole custody of the parties' three children (none of whom had yet begun college). With respect to college expenses, the divorce decree contained a standard reservation provision: "The Court expressly reserves the issue of each party's obligation to contribute to the college or other education expenses of the parties' children pursuant to Section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution [of Marriage] Act." *Id.* at *1. In other words, neither parent had an obligation to contribute a specific amount of money towards their children's college expenses upon entry of the divorce decree. Their obligations were instead reserved for a later day.

That later day arrived on May 17, 2007, when the wife petitioned the trial court to allocate the college expenses of the parties' children. Specifically, she requested the following contributions from her ex-husband: (1) all previously paid tuition and expenses for her oldest child who attended college in 2002 and graduated in 2006; (2) all previously paid and future tuition and expenses for the second child who began college in 2004 and was still in school at the time of the wife's petition; and (3) all future tuition and expenses for the parties' youngest child who was set to graduate from high school in the days following the wife's petition.

As illustrated, the wife's petition requested her ex-husband to contribute to expenses that were accrued and paid by the wife prior to her petition as well as future expenses yet to accrue and yet to be paid. The trial court granted the wife's petition and ordered the husband to pay 75% of the college expenses for all three children (regardless of whether the expenses were accrued or paid before or after the filing of the wife's petition). The appellate court disagreed and held that the trial court could not order the husband to pay for college expenses that predated the notice of filing of wife's petition to allocate college expenses. *Petersen v. Petersen*, 403 Ill. App. 3d 839, 846 (1 Dist. 2010). The wife then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois wherein she argued that the appellate court erred in precluding her from obtaining college contributions from her ex-husband for expenses that predated her petition.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed with the wife. The court held that when a divorce decree reserves the issue of college expenses pursuant to Section 513, and one party later petitions the court to allocate said college expenses, the court may not order the other party to contribute to expenses that "predate" the petition. *In re the Marriage of Petersen*, No. 1108984, 2011 WL 4391130, at *6 (Ill. Sep. 22, 2011). Accordingly, the wife in *Petersen* would be unable to receive financial contributions from her ex-husband for the tens of thousands of dollars in college expenses of her children that predated her May 2007 petition.

The court's decision was premised both on statutory construction and underlying policy concerns. From a statutory perspective, the court explained that Section 510 of the IMDMA governed the wife's petition, which required the conclusion that expenses that predated the petition were not recoverable. *In re the Marriage of Petersen*, No. 1108984, 2011 WL 4391130, at *2-3 (Ill. Sep. 22, 2011). Section 510 provides, "Except as otherwise provided . . . the provisions of any judgment respecting maintenance or *support* may be *modified* only as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice by the moving party of the filing of the motion for modification. . ." 750 ILCS 5/510. The court first explained that Section 510 applied because college contributions are a form of support and are thus modifiable only pursuant to Section 510. *Id.* at *2-3. The court then explained that the wife's petition to allocate college contributions was indeed a modification of the parties' original divorce decree, which merely reserved the issue of college expenses. *Id.* at *3-4. Therefore, "[u]nder the plain language of the statute, a retroactive modification is limited only to those installments that date back to the filing of the petition for modification." *Id.* at *4.

The court further justified its decision based upon underlying policy concerns. Specifically, the court noted that if an individual were able to receive contributions from their ex-spouse for any and all college expenses, regardless of when said expenses were initially incurred or even paid, then individuals could "wait indefinitely until seeking to act pursuant to the reservation clause." *Id.* at *6. The court stated that various purposes of the IMDMA—including mitigating harm to spouses and children caused by divorce proceedings and securing maximum involvement of both parents regarding their children after divorce litigation—are furthered by prompt resolution of reserved issues such as college expenses. *Id.*

Practitioners should note that scope of *Petersen* is limited to post-decree cases involving reservation provisions. Where an individual does not have a final divorce decree, but instead simply petitions the court during the pendency of their divorce proceeding for allocation of college expenses, *Petersen* is not necessarily controlling. For example, *In re the Marriage of Chee*, No. 1-10-2797, 2011 WL 3186508 (1 Dist. Jul. 22, 2011), involved a wife who moved the court (pursuant to a motion for summary judgment during the underlying petition for dissolution/invalidity of marriage proceeding) to order her husband to contribute to their two children's college expenses even though most of the expenses were incurred prior to the wife's request. The husband disagreed and claimed that that the *Petersen* appellate decision precluded such an order, as the expenses were incurred prior to wife's motion. *Id.* at *5.

Chee distinguished *Petersen* on the basis that *Petersen* involved a final divorce decree with a reservation provision. *Id.* at *5. When the wife in *Petersen* requested allocation of college expenses, she "sought a modification of a final judgment bringing the case within the scope of section 510(a) of the Marriage Act and limiting the father's liability for his children's education to the notice date of the mother's expense petition." *Id. Chee* did not involve a modification of a final order and thus Section 510 was inapplicable. *Id.* at *5. Thus,

the spouse in *Chee* was not legally precluded from seeking a college expense contribution for expenses that predated her motion.

Overall, *Petersen* nonetheless provides a cautionary reminder for thousands of divorced individuals in Illinois. Namely, spouses who possess divorce decrees that reserve college expenses for further determination, yet eventually desire to obtain a contribution to these expenses from their ex-spouse, must be sure to petition the court for said contribution at the earliest possible time to ensure they are not precluded from receiving contributions for expenses that predate the petition. Notably, *Petersen* does not expressly explain when an expense will be deemed to have predated a petition. Is the date upon which the expense is incurred instructive? The invoice due date? The actual date of payment? Absent express guidance from the court, family law practitioners should err on the side of caution and advise their clients to file their petitions for college contributions as soon as practicable. Otherwise, the client could end up footing the bill for thousands of dollars that may otherwise be subject to contribution from their ex-spouse. ■

Yes, you have two husbands

By Angela Peters

Joy and Joe have lived in Illinois, and were married years ago in China. They get divorced and Joy marries Bill, an American citizen. Joy and Bill had submitted a 1-120 visa petition on behalf of Joy, in order for her to become an American citizen. What they are actually doing is seeking to confer upon Joy the benefits of Section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), as the spouse of a citizen of the United States. (The McCarran-Walter bill of 1952, Public Law No. 82-414, and also at Title 8 of the U.S. Code (8 USC)).

Joy and Joe were married in China and had been residents of China all of their lives until they moved to the United States. They resided in Illinois for longer than 90 days, and returned to China just to get divorced. The divorce was granted by the Chinese court.

Joy and Bill had been advised by the INS that the new marriage could not be recognized because she and her ex husband did not reside in China when they obtained a divorce there. Therefore, the marriage between Joy and Bill is invalid. She is asking you to advise her whether the Chinese divorce is valid or not, and what she needs to do. What say you?

Section 201(b) of the Act states in part: The "immediate relatives" referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States: ...the immediate relatives specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations of this Act.

8 C.F.R.204.2(cX2) states: If a petition is submitted on behalf of a wife or husband, it must be accompanied by a certificate of marriage to the beneficiary and proof of the legal termination of all previous marriages of both wife and husband.

In *Matter of Weaver.* 16 I&N Dec. 730 (BIA 1979), the Board of Immigration Appeals held that the validity of a divorce entered into while neither party to it is domiciled in the place where it was granted, but where both parties appeared for the divorce, should be judged by the law of the jurisdiction where the parties to the divorce were domiciled at the time of your divorce. The Board stated at page 732 of the decision: "Since the place where the parties to the divorce were domiciled at the time of the divorce was the only place with an interest in the proceedings at that time, the parties should be able to rely on the law of that state, even if they move to another jurisdiction."

In *Matter of Luna,* ID #2939, (BIA 1983) the Board again addressed the validity of foreign divorces for immigration purposes. Citing 24 Am.Jur.2nd, *Divorce and Separation*, sections 964-65 (1966); Annot., 13 A.L. R.3d 1419 (1967), the Board* decision reads at pages 2 and 3: "A foreign court must have jurisdiction to render a valid decree, and the applicable tests of jurisdiction are ordinarily those of the United States, rather than of the divorcing country, and a divorce obtained in a foreign country will not normally be recognized as valid if neither of the spouses had a domicile in that country, even though domicile is not a requirement for jurisdiction under the divorcing country's laws." Citing various Federal and state court decisions, the Board's decision in *Luna* reads at page 3: 'The domicile of the parties has long been recognized as the primary, if not the exclusive, basis for the judicial power to grant a divorce."

Marriage and divorce generally are considered matters reserved to the states rather than to the federal government. See, *Sosna v. Iowa*, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). There is no treaty in force between the United States and any country on enforcement of judgments, including recognition of foreign divorces. There are no provisions under U.S. law or regulation for registration of foreign divorce decrees at U.S. embassies or consulates abroad.

A divorce decree issued in a foreign country generally is recognized in a state in the United States on the basis of comity (*Hilton v. Guyot*, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)), provided both parties to the divorce received adequate notice, i.e., service of process and, generally, provided one of the parties was a domiciliary in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. Under the principle of comity, a divorce obtained in another country under the circumstances described above receives "full faith and credit" in all other states and countries that recognize divorce. Although full faith and credit may be given to an ex parte divorce decree, states usually consider the jurisdictional basis upon which the foreign decree is founded and may withhold full faith and credit if not satisfied regarding domicile in the foreign country.

Recognition may be withheld for various reasons, as where it is contrary to the public policy of the state where the recognition is sought, where the country in which it was rendered does not recognize American decrees, where it is invalid or wanting in integrity by reason of lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court, lack of domicile in the foreign country, where it was obtained in bad faith, by fraud or by taking advantage of the foreign law on the part of one who left the state and went to the foreign country for that purpose, where the operation of the decree would do wrong or injury to the citizens of the state, or where its recognition would work injustice to an innocent party. *Nelson, Divorce and Annulment*, 2d Ed., Vol. 3, pages

440-441. Many state courts which have addressed the question of a foreign divorce where both parties participate in the divorce proceedings but neither obtains domicile there have followed the view that such a divorce is invalid.

An early case on the validity of foreign divorces in the State of Illinois is *Clubb v. Clubb*, 402 Ill. 390, 84 N.E.2d 386 (1949). States are not required to give full faith and credit to divorces rendered in foreign nations. Whether a state will give force and effect to a foreign divorce decree is solely a question of comity. The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 1, U.S. Constitution) does not require an Illinois court to recognize or enforce the decree of a foreign country. *Clubb v. Clubb*, 402 Ill. 390, 84 N.E.2d 366 (1949); *Tailby v. Tailby*, 342 Ill.App. 664, 97 N.E.2d 611 (1951); *Nardi v. Segal,* 90 Ill.App.2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805 (1967).

'There being no statute conferring specific authority on courts of equity to enforce decrees of a foreign country, we have considered whether or not under its general powers a court of equity might assume such jurisdiction. We have heretofore held that jurisdiction of courts of equity to determine divorce cases and all matters relating thereto is conferred only by statute, and that these courts may exercise their powers in such matters within the limit of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute and not otherwise, as the jurisdiction depends solely upon the grant of the statute and not upon general equity powers. *Arndt v. Arndt*, 399 Ill. 490, 78 N.E.2d 272; *Smith v. Smith*, 334 Ill. 370, 166 N.E. 85; *Smith v. Johnson*, 321 Ill. 134, 151 N.E. 550; *Hager v. Hager*, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047, (4th, 1971).

750 ILCS 5/401(a) states in pertinent part: The court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage if at the time the action was commenced one of the spouses was a resident of this State or was stationed in this State while a member of the armed services, and the residence or military presence had been maintained for 90 days next preceding the commencement of the action or the marking of the finding.

When applying the relevant facts to this case, the record does not establish that Joy or her husband Joe resided in China continuously for any period of time immediately prior to the filing of the divorce petition. As a result the residency requirement mandated by Illinois law had not been met. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that under Illinois law the divorce that was obtained by Joy in China is invalid. Therefore, her present marriage cannot be considered valid under the immigration laws, and the visa petition submitted on behalf of Joy, must be denied. The best and simplest advice may be that the couples, Joy and Joe, and Joy and Bill, each get divorced, and that Joy and Bill then marry. Problem solved.

Modern courts have a problem with the facts that: approximately 50 percent of all marriages end in divorce, there is a great demand for fast and inexpensive divorces, and Americans can travel quite easily and fast to foreign countries to seek a quick divorce. **"**Foreign "migratory" divorces fall into four basic categories: (Nichols, Recognition and Enforcement: American Courts, Look at Foreign Divorces, 9 Family Advocate 9-10, 37 (1987)).

Essentially, there are four types of foreign divorces. If the divorce takes place with both parties present in the divorcing country, it is known as a bilateral divorce. In this case, one party can actually be present and the other, if in another location, can be represented by their attorney. The next type of foreign divorce is known as an ex parte divorce, a process in which only one party is participating in the divorce in the absence of the other. A practical recognition divorce is when the recognition of a foreign divorce is denied because it would be an unfair judgment for the party involved. "Practical recognition" divorces, wherein practical recognition may be afforded such decrees because of estoppel, laches, unclean hands, or similar equitable doctrines under which the party attacking the decree may be effectively barred from securing a judgment of invalidity. *13 A.L.R. 3d* 1419, 1452. Many jurisdictions will prohibit the spouse who consented to the divorce from attacking it later under a principle of fairness called "estoppel". Thus, a party may be precluded from attacking a foreign divorce decree if such an attack would be inequitable under the circumstances. A void divorce is basically an ex parte divorce in which one party is unaware of the divorce. This is not a valid type of divorce and will not be officially recognized in the United States.

The Uniform Act on Marriage and Divorce (1970, 1973), *9A Unif. Laws. Ann*. 461 (Supp. 1965), is in force in Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, and Washington state. Section 314(c) of the Uniform Act on Marriage and Divorce establishes a procedure for the clerk of court where the divorce decree is issued to register the decree in the place where the marriage itself was originally registered. The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 9 Unif. Laws Ann. 644 (1979), specifically denies recognition to a divorce decree obtained in another jurisdiction when both spouses were domiciled in the home state. The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act is in force in California, Nebraska,

The Uniform Act on Marriage and Divorce, applicable in states such as Arizona, Georgia and Kentucky, forces the court clerk to register the divorce in the country where the marriage was registered. In other words, if you marry in Russia and divorce in Kentucky, your divorce will be registered in Russia. The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, applicable in states such as California, North Dakota and Wisconsin, says that a foreign divorce will not be recognized if both parties reside in the home state.

Getting a divorce overseas is not a problem or something you should necessarily avoid, but be aware of the jurisdiction. Generally, the United States will recognize a divorce that took place in a foreign country as long as certain circumstances are met. Each one of the United States has its own individual terms on divorce. However, according to the basis of comity, states in America will generally accept the terms of the divorce that were set in the foreign country. In other words, the laws where you got married will carry over to the U.S. It is not a guarantee, and the recognition on the basis of comity can be withheld. ■

Upcoming CLE programs

To register, go to www.isba.org/cle or call the ISBA registrar at 800-252-8908 or 217-525-1760.

December

Thursday, 12/1/11- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office—Recent Developments in State and Local Tax- 2011. Presented by the ISBA State and Local Tax Committee. 9-12.

Thursday, 12/1/11- Teleseminar—Business Planning with S Corps, Part 1. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Friday, 12/2/11- Teleseminar—Business Planning with S Corps, Part 2. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Friday, 12/2/11- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office—Motion Practice- From Pleadings through Post-Trial. Presented by the ISBA Civil Practice & Procedure Section. 8:50-2:15.

Thursday, 12/6/11- Teleseminar—Estate Planning for Retirement Benefits. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Thursday, 12/8/11- Chicago, Sheraton Hotel—ISBA Basic Skills Course 6.0 Live. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 9-4:30.

Friday, 12/9/11- Chicago, Sheraton Hotel—Master Series: Divine Ethics: Avoiding the Chasm of Incivility. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 1:00-4:14.

Tuesday, 12/13/11- Teleseminar—Individual Liability for Corporate Obligations: Piercing the Corporate Veil. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Wednesday, 12/14/11- Webcast—Jury Selection. Presented by the ISBA Criminal Justice Section. 12-1.

Thursday, 12/15/11- Teleseminar—UCC Issues in Real Estate Transactions. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Tuesday, 12/20/11- Teleseminar—Asset Protection Strategies for Real Estate. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Wednesday, 12/21/11- Teleseminar—Tax Efficient Methods of Getting Money out of a Business. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

January

Thursday, 1/5/12- Teleseminar—Estate Planning in 2012: Now That the Federal Tax is a Dead Letter, Part 1. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Friday, 1/6/12- Teleseminar—Estate Planning in 2012: Now That the Federal Tax is a Dead Letter, Part 2. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Tuesday, 1/10/12- Teleseminar—Dangers of Using "Units" in LLC Planning. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Friday, 1/13/12- Teleseminar—Bridging the Valuation Gap: "Earnouts" and Other Techniques. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Tuesday, 1/17/12- Teleseminar—Real Estate Finance in A World With Tight Credit and Less Leverage. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Wednesday, 1/18/12- Live Studio Webcast—Step-by-Step Appeals in Child Custody. Presented by the ISBA Child Law Section; co-sponsored by the ISBA Family Law Section. 11-1.

Thursday, 1/19/12- Teleseminar—Ethics, Technology and Solo and Small Firm Practitioners. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Friday, 1/20/12- Teleseminar—Rescission in Business Transactions: Techniques for Fixing Transactions Gone Awry. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Friday, 1/20/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office—Practical Professional Responsibility for Health Care, Life Sciences and Corporate Attorneys and their Outside Counsel. Presented by the ISBA Health Care Section. 1-4:15.

Friday, 1/20/12- Collinsville, Gateway Center—Motion Practice. Presented by the ISBA Tort Law Section. 9-12. Max 66.

Tuesday, 1/24/12- Teleseminar—Incentive Trusts: Approaches and Limits to Encouraging "Good" Behavior in Beneficiaries. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Thursday, 1/26/12- Chicago, Union League Club—Making the Record on Appeal and Ethics and Civility in the Court Room. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association, the Illinois Judges Association and the Women's Bar Association of Illinois. 1:30-4:55 CLE; 5-6:30 Reception.

Friday, 1/27/12- Teleseminar—Drafting Effective and Enforceable Promissory Notes. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Tuesday, 1/31/11- Teleseminar—Choice of Entity for Service Businesses, Including Law Firms. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

February

Thursday, 2/2/12- Teleseminar—2012 Ethics Update, Part 1. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Friday, 2/3/12- Bloomington, Holiday Inn & Suites—Hot Topics in Agricultural Law 2012. Presented by the ISBA Agricultural Law Section. 9-4:45. Max 150

Friday, 2/3/12- Teleseminar—2012 Ethics Update, Part 2. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Tuesday, 2/7/12- Teleseminar—Estate Planning for the Elderly, Part 1. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Wednesday, 2/8/12- Teleseminar—Estate Planning for the Elderly, Part 2. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

Thursday, 2/9/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office—Nuts and Bolts of Starting Your Own Practice: A Primer for Ethically Creating Your Own Law Firm. Presented by the ISBA young Lawyers Division. 12:30-5:00. ■

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