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‘Tis the season for Illinois courts to issue decisions about snow removal liability! Last December, the First District Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment award to the plaintiff, in Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc.1 The plaintiff then petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal, and the Court agreed to hear the case. The Supreme Court just recently issued its decision, affirming the First District in reversing the summary judgment award.2 The decision is important in clarifying what had been a split issue among Illinois appellate courts – to what extent does the Snow and Ice Removal Act (the “Act”) provide immunity when the claim arises from a snow or ice-related issue, but NOT from the alleged negligent removal of naturally accumulating snow or ice.3
In Murphy-Hylton, the plaintiff alleged that she had injured herself by slipping on a patch of ice on an otherwise clear sidewalk. She alleged that there had been no natural snow or ice accumulation, and instead alleged a faulty gutter / downspout installation had caused runoff to flow onto the sidewalk and then puddle and freeze. She sued the condominium association, the property management company, and the landscaping and snow and ice removal contractor.4 The owner of the contractor company testified at his deposition that the contractor had also performed drainage work for the association, including rerouting some downspouts.
At Illinois common law, a landowner has no duty to remove natural accumulations of snow, but can have a duty to remove unnatural accumulations, and can incur liability for negligently undertaking to remove snow or ice.5 The Snow and Ice Removal Act expresses a public policy to encourage owners and others residing in residential units to clean snow and ice from sidewalks abutting their residences.6 For that reason, the statute acts as a liability shield against negligent efforts, unless their actions or omissions are willful or wanton.7
But what is the impact of the Act on cases involving alleged negligence as to snow and ice, but not unnatural accumulation? The Appellate Court looked at two other recent cases, one from the Fourth District (the Greene case)8 and one from the Second District (the Ryan case),9 which reached different conclusions and were cited by the parties. The First District Court noted that although the two opinions might appear to be in conflict at first glance, they were not necessarily inapposite when the differing facts involved were considered.
In Greene, the Fourth District reversed a dismissal favoring the defense based on the Act, because the plaintiff had raised a negligence suit in which she alleged slipping on ice that was present due to defendants’ defective or improperly maintained roof, gutters, and downspout, NOT due to negligent removal of natural accumulations.10 In Ryan, the Second District affirmed an award of summary judgment for the defendants based on the Act. But in that case the plaintiff alleged both that the defendants had failed to correct a design flaw (ice formed from water dripping from an awning), AND that the defendants had voluntarily undertook to remove snow and ice but failed to clear the patch in which she slipped.11
The First District in Murphy-Hylton agreed with the Fourth District in Greene, that “the Act does not apply to cases where the plaintiff’s complaint is silent as to negligent snow removal efforts but rather is grounded in allegations that defendants negligently maintained or constructed their premises.”12 The court distinguished Ryan because that case contained allegations of negligent snow and ice removal; the First District then went on to say it “disagreed” with the Ryan court to the extent the ruling purported to go beyond that.13 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the First District, and noted “The Ryan court’s interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the Act and would improperly expand the immunity beyond its expressly stated language.14 The Supreme Court specifically held that the Act is not an affirmative defense to the negligence theory pled by plaintiff in this case.15
The Murphy-Hylton rulings confirm that the Snow and Ice Removal Act does not automatically shield building owners and contractors from liability for negligence related to snow and ice. If the allegations do not arise from a natural accumulation, and instead allege some other negligent act by the defendant caused plaintiff’s injuries, then the common law standard for such a negligence claim is still the law in Illinois. The mere fact that snow or ice is involved does not automatically trigger immunity under the Act! That does not mean plaintiffs such as Ms. Murphy-Hylton will necessarily win, but it will make it more difficult for defendants to dismiss these claims or prevail on summary judgment quickly and cost-effectively.