Introduction

Despite being of paramount concern in times of crisis, food system resilience is a topic regularly contemplated and rarely implemented. Food security refers to a food system’s ability to provide “for all people at all times . . . access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food [and] to maintain a healthy and active life.”¹ Without resiliency, however, food security cannot thrive. A food system must be able to “cope with, and adapt to, changes.”² Rather than capitalizing on the resiliency of the U.S. food system during this current pandemic, our food system choked due to the collective lack of planning and implementing an effective, timely response. Our food system could not rely on robust resilience mechanisms because that resilience simply does not yet exist.

The disruptions witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic were preventable and warned of. Few government actors over the past decade have been receptive to the pleas to ignite government action in food crisis planning. The risks and weaknesses of the U.S. food supply chain are well documented, and we have long known the risks.³ In their place, efficiency concerns play the paramount role in crisis planning, reflecting a policy that neglects the critical role local and regional food systems have in bolstering resilience of the greater food supply chain. This neglect was largely ignored in non-crisis times, despite preexisting and persisting issues of food insecurity nation-wide, driven by socioeconomic factors. The COVID-19 pandemic forced a reckoning with these deficiencies and the country was put face-to-face with them for the first time in this generation’s lifetime. Just as underlying social and political tensions bubbled to the forefront of society, the pandemic also placed a national spotlight on the fragility of an efficient and extractionist approach to managing the food supply chain.

Empty grocery store shelves, rotting produce in the fields, and gallons of milk dumped rather than sold manifested as symptoms of the fragile nature of the U.S. food system. COVID-19 upended channels of distribution and rendered the national food supply chain paralyzed, unable to match supply to demand because of the broader food supply’s inherent inflexibility. Food is security, and consumers did what was necessary in the time of a global pandemic to obtain sustenance—for those with the financial means and access, attention turned from large retailers to local farmers down the road. Consumer reliance on local and regional food systems to supplement the failures of the national one demonstrated a reality widely ignored that these systems are integral to stable, consistent access to nutrients for all people.

The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting food supply chain disruptions brings disaster planning and food crisis response to a head. At the federal level, three primary agencies—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)—hold responsibility for ensuring the food supply chain remains intact during a disaster. Aimed at preventing and reacting to future terrorist attacks, the post-9/11 federal government implemented a series of binding statues and regulations, along with other guiding documents, some of which specifically address food security while others establish procedures for intergovernmental coordination that could be useful in a food-related incident. These measures proved ineffective. The most robust food crisis responses, to the extent they are enacted and implemented, came from the state level. This piece reviews the limited progress governments have made to update and modernize food crisis planning.⁴

Federal Agencies and Food Crisis Response Measures

DHS

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (2002 Bioterrorism Act) “is the cornerstone post-9/11 federal statute related to increasing food security.”⁵ The Act directs the Secretary of DHS to “develop and implement a coordinated strategy . . . for carrying out health-related activities to prepare for and respond effectively to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.”⁶ Although the title of the 2002 Bioterrorism Act indicates a limited scope, it encompasses more public health emergencies than just bioterrorism attacks. The Act also aims to coordinate efforts to bolster emergency preparedness for any other public health emergency, which includes pandemics like COVID-19.⁷
The Act further tasks the Secretary with ensuring coordination of activities with those of state and local governments.⁸ The strategy implemented must ensure effective public health surveillance and reporting mechanisms, ensure laboratory and medical readiness, properly train and equip personnel, establish effective communication networks, and minimize the duplication of government response planning.⁹

Title III of the Act addresses the safety and security of the food and drug supply.¹⁰ It directs the President’s Council on Food Safety in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of the Treasury, and other relevant agencies and stakeholders to develop a crisis communications and education strategy with respect to threats to the food supply.¹¹ The strategies “shall address threat assessments; technologies and procedures for securing food processing and manufacturing facilities and modes of transportation; response and notification procedures; and risk communications to the public.”¹² The Act also highlights the importance of improving the safety of imported food, which includes increased inspections of food imports, improvements to information management systems and coordination between agencies and states, and increased testing for rapid detection of adulteration of food. ¹³

In addition to legislation, the government aimed several Homeland Security Presidential Directives at increasing food resiliency and strengthening the agriculture sector in response to disaster incidents.¹⁴ Although the FDA and USDA are the two agencies with primary responsibility for carrying out mandates related to food, DHS participates with them in several cooperative initiatives with them.

Despite DHS creating multiple programs and policies to enhance disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response,¹⁵ the actual implementation actions taken by DHS have mostly overlooked the buildup of local and regional food systems as a solution to build resiliency in the food and agriculture sector, but do provide an avenue by which this can be thought of and implemented into future planning.

FDA

In 2011, the passage of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) was thought to transform “the nation’s food safety system by shifting focus from responding to foodborne illness to preventing it.”¹⁶ Congress acknowledged the dramatic changes in the global food system and wanted to ensure the safety of the global food supply. The FSMA also recognized the importance of giving the FDA authority to enforce compliance.¹⁷ To meet this end, FSMA further gave FDA power to respond via mandatory recalls, expanded administrative detention, suspension of registration, enhanced product tracking abilities, and additional recordkeeping for high risk foods.¹⁸ Built into the Act is a focus on building partnerships with agencies, state, local, and foreign governments to better implement strategies and enhance food safety throughout the nation. Innovations in the FSMA revitalized the FDA’s authority in maintaining a safe national food supply.¹⁹

FDA issued a Food Protection Plan in November 2007, which aims to better prevent, intervene, and respond to food emergencies.²⁰ Although the FSMA provided a ready-made opportunity to update the Food Protection Plan, the rather dated 2007 version remains. The plan applies to food for people and animals, addresses domestic and imported products, and encompasses food safety domestically and food defense internationally.²¹ The Food Protection Plan stresses the importance of prevention through “close interaction with growers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and good service providers, and importers.”²² FDA further recognizes the importance of working with “industry, state, local, and foreign governments to further develop the tools and science needed to identify vulnerabilities and determine the most effective approaches.”²³

USDA

The USDA’s Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan “describes the organizational structure, and establishes procedures for the implementation of these responsibilities at the national, regional, State, and county levels.”²⁴ Taking guidance from the previous Homeland Security Presidential Directives listed in footnote 13, the plan codifies responsibilities of all levels of government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While it emphasizes local planning, the plan places much of the burden of response with State and county emergency boards. Federal agencies will intervene in accordance to the National Response Framework, when needed.

Included in the plan is a discussion about the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), which allows the President to establish priority contracts to promote the national defense and to allocate materials, services, and facilities in such manner.²⁵ “USDA has jurisdiction for food, food resource facilities, distribution of farm equipment, and commercial fertilizer,” which is delegated under the DPA and EO 12919.²⁶ The Agriculture Priorities and Allocation System (APAS) takes the authority granted by the DPA and established a procedure for the prioritization of contracts to ensure timely delivery of items that have been deemed necessary in times of emergency. The Secretary of Homeland Security has pre-approved programs that enable USDA to issue priority contracts without receiving concurrence from DHS, which include programs involving food and food resources, processing and storage, as well as programs to protect or restore the agriculture and food system from attacks, disasters, and other emergencies.²⁷ The plan also addresses the USDA’s allocation authority, and discusses that it is limited and can be used only when there is insufficient supply of a material, service, or facility to establish national defense supply requirements.²⁸

Multi-Agency Cooperative and State Level Food Crisis Initiatives

Beyond federal-agency-specific planning, there have been inter-agency initiatives and state-level planning aimed at addressing food crisis response. The Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism Initiative (SPPA) is a joint effort of the FBI, DHS, USDA, and FDA, in partnerships with private industry and the states to help secure the nation’s food supply. The SPPA aims to “collect the necessary data to identify sector-specific vulnerabilities, develop mitigation strategies, identify research gaps and needs, and increase awareness and coordination between the food and agriculture government and industry partners.”²⁹ The initiative was first created to meet the requirements of the NIPP, food and agriculture SSPs, and HSPD-9, and was reauthorized in the Securing Our Agriculture and Food Act in 2017. After an assessment of the various nodes of the food production and processing chain, the SPAA identified large scale food processing and crowded agriculture production as nodes of highest concern. The SPAA then issued several mitigation strategies to help combat the effects of a terror attack in the agricultural industry including encouraging industries to develop specific food defense plans. However, less robust federal food crisis response planning leaves much of the planning and execution to local and state governments.

The National Association of State Departments of Agriculture has developed a Food Emergency Response Plan (FERP) Template for states and localities to use in drafting their own FERPs for integration into their respective State Emergency Operations Plans. Most recently issues in 2011, the FERP template aims to protect public health by enhancing the protection of the United States agricultural industry and food security through “increased prevention, detection, response, and recovery planning.”³⁰ A food emergency as address by the plan involves the adulteration and/or contamination of food that impacts or may impact human health. The FERP contemplates “food emergencies that may involve a large number of people in a small area, or that are widespread, involving a number of localities or states.”³¹

Further enforcing the importance of mitigation, the FERP says that “a state should conduct hazard analysis regarding the food industry prior to the identification of ‘situations’ for emergency response planning.”³² The FERP directs states as part of the planning process to assess various aspects of their unique food systems to better plan for specific disruptions in their areas. These include unique physical or geographic features, where food distribution and processing centers are located within the state, cultural aspects of the state, and major population areas.

Federal-level planning on the whole is emblematic of the dearth of action taken to bolster food system resiliency. Focused more on managing the risks of terrorism on the food supply than risks like a pandemic, federal policies—to the extent they address the lack of resiliency in the U.S. food system—rely on existing commodity distribution channels rather than the development or encouragement of non-traditional channels. DHS plans do nothing to assess local and regional capabilities and assets in broader response planning; and planners have yet to utilize the National Disaster Recovery Framework to assess local risks. FDA and USDA planning commits similar transgression and overlook effective resiliency implementation strategies, though these agencies do more to focus on at least acknowledging resiliency issues in the food supply—if only because of the food-related nature of these agencies. Much of the efforts made by the FDA and USDA’s programs represent mere desire for resiliency in place of its actual pursuit, a series of ad hoc efforts instead of formal, planned responses to the pandemic. Government planning requires far more responsive strategies for the inevitable consequences disasters and crises place on the U.S. food supply.

The country cannot rely on government efforts alone to bolster resiliency—this much is clear from the government’s unwillingness or inability to date to successfully incorporate local and regional food into crisis and disaster response planning. Rather, resiliency in the U.S. food system must come from the collaborative effort of private actors supported by state government funding and coordinating initiatives. It is often the smaller, private groups like food banks, farmers markets, and food policy councils, after all, that take concrete action to address issues of food insecurity caused by a lack of resiliency. Though the government may tangentially address food system resiliency, the actual bolstering of resilience will more likely to come from increased federal and state support for local and regional establishments that have the capability—but lack the resources—to effectively respond in times of crisis and disaster.

A Brief Look at Illinois

With much of the burden of crisis planning and response falling on local and state governments, a discussion of Illinois emergency planning doctrine follows to illustrate a state-level approach to emergency planning in the agricultural sector.

Illinois Emergency Management Act

The Illinois Emergency Management Agency is responsible for the coordination of overall emergency planning management for the state. The Illinois Emergency Operations Plan (IEOP) establishes the structure by which the Illinois state government coordinates and manages disaster response and recovery.³³ The IEOP describes the Illinois Disaster Management System (IDMS), which is used by the state in conformance with National Incident Management System (NIMS) when the IEOP is implemented for response and recovery operations in the state.³⁴ While Annex 14 of the IEOP contemplates disease outbreaks, its focus solely is on the safety and security of the existing commercial food supply, to the exclusion of local and regional food supplies.³⁵

Illinois Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan (INHMP)

In addition to the IEOP and response actions, Illinois has also developed the Illinois Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan (INHMP), which establishes a process for identifying and mitigating the effects of natural hazards in Illinois.³⁶ Illinois elected to create the Illinois Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan in 2014 that states that food and other basic necessities should be supplied and that they are to be safe and available in sufficient quantities. Despite this impressive rhetoric, the plan lacks concrete procedures to ensure these goals.³⁷
In sum, these response and mitigation measures at the state-level do little to augment an already lacking federal response that could ensure that local and regional food supplies are able to supplement consumer needs when traditional supply chains are failing during a pandemic like COVID-19. Rather than a reactive approach, planners should address these failures in future state and local planning efforts.

Planning for Future Resiliency

Now forced to reckon with the consequences of a food system prioritizing industrialized agriculture and efficiency, “the pandemic indicates the urgency of rethinking the food system and its characteristics.”³⁸ The formalized integration of local and regional food systems into the larger food supply chain by government entities and agencies through their existing programs could provide necessary change. While federal government planning falls far short of ensuring a resilient and redundant food supply chain, a fundamental framework from which to build already exists in initiatives like that of the USDA’s efforts to develop urban agriculture. Ultimately, some form of food democracy that closes the gap between producer and consumer is the goal.

Integrating local and regional producers yields benefits beyond the strengthening and stabilizing of the U.S. food supply; integration allows consumers to “take charge of their consumption” as they are “buying fruit and vegetable boxes and going to their local butchers and bakers.”³⁹ It is these actions that turn consumers “into ‘active citizens’ who carefully choose what is on their plate.”⁴⁰ As consumers increasingly purchase locally and directly, their consumption generally includes more nutritious foods that consequently benefit public health. Both good for citizens and for the environment, the restructuring of our food system could also promote the use and spread of more sustainable farming practices and “construct alternative models of production, distribution, and retailing that offer choices and alternatives for people with various incomes.”⁴¹ The COVID-19 pandemic has “[created] a rare opportunity for radical change,” based on “a strong framework for multilevel food governance by putting the emphasis on local and regional production that encourages the consumption of seasonal and healthy produce (in combination with longer food supply chains and the provisioning of sustainable products), employing local agricultural workers and establishing better relationships between producers and retailers, whilst ensuring that the security and diversity of food are maintained.”⁴² Many promises were made and initiatives started regarding food security after the 9/11 attacks. But complacency soon set in and progress stalled. With the fervent hope that the COVID-19 pandemic comes to a close soon, we should not revert back to past practices and then wait for the next crisis to react, but rather learn from today’s challenges and take this opportunity build true resilience in the food system that makes full use of the potential strength of our local and region food producers.

Jessica Guarino, postdoctoral research associate, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, LL.M. (Agricultural and Food Law). The authors would like to thank our research assistant, Bradley Windings, for his substantial information gathering and drafting contributions to the article upon which this piece is based.

A. Bryan Endres, professor of food & agricultural law and director, Bock Program in Agricultural Law & Policy, University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics. This research was supported by the C. Allen and Darren A. Bock Agricultural Law and Policy Program and the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Hatch Project # ILLU-470-348. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations do not necessarily reflect the view of the funding entities.